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MY BROTHER, MY WITNESS AGAINST ME:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
"AGAINST PENAL INTEREST" HEARSAY
EXCEPTION IN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
ANALYSIS
Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Lilly v. Virginia1 the United States Supreme Court exam-
ined whether the admission of an accomplice's custodial confes-
sion violated a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation.2 The statement at issue was admitted into evi-
dence under the "against penal interest" exception to the hear-
say rule because the confession contained statements that
inculpated both the declarant and the defendant.3 In a plurality
opinion, the Supreme Court held that accomplice confessions
that inculpate a criminal defendant do not fall within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception.! The Court also authorized appellate
courts to independently review whether the government's "prof-
fered guarantees of trustworthiness"5 are sufficient to satisfy the
Confrontation Clause's residual admissibility test.
6
This Note examines the history of the Court's Confronta-
tion Clause jurisprudence and the development of the relation-
ship between the "against penal interest" hearsay exception and
the Clause. This Note also analyzes the implications of the Lilly
decision on future prosecutions of co-defendants. This Note
concludes that in Lilly the Supreme Court correctly heightened
the standard for admissibility of accomplice statements. The
decision in Lilly is especially important because the Supreme
1119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999).
" See id. at 1892.
3 See id. at 1892.
See id. at 1899.
'Id. at 1900.
aSee id. at 1899.
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Court of Virginia's interpretation of the hearsay exception un-
dermined the constitutional protections afforded criminal de-
fendants by the Confrontation Clause.
II. BACKGROUND
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
7
provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him
.... , Scholars have debated the true origin of the Confronta-
tion Clause, but most agree that the Clause was included in the
Sixth Amendment to prevent the government's use of ex parte
affidavits in lieu of live witnesses, a common practice in six-
teenth- and seventeenth-century English criminal prosecution.9
The Framers believed strongly in the right to confront one's ac-
cuser through cross-examination and thus guaranteed it in the
Sixth Amendment. ° During the last century, however, the Su-
preme Court has permitted the admission of certain hearsay
statements in cases where the witness is unavailable to testify.
11
The constitutional guarantee of confrontation was not chal-
lenged in the United States Supreme Court until 1895 in Mattox
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (applying Sixth Amendment to the
States via the Fourteenth Amendment).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Pro-
posalfor a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 568 (1992); see also Stan-
ley A. Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted: Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C. L.
REv. 1, 4 (1987); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Al-
ternative Histo"y, 27 RUTGERs L.J. 77, 77 (1995). "Early American documents almost
never mention the right, and the traditional sources for divining the Framers' intent
yield almost no information about the clause." Id. The most prevalent abuse was the
admission of ex parte affidavits accusing the defendant without an opportunity to
question the affiant, illustrated best by Sir Walter Raleigh's 1603 treason trial where
the principal witness, Lord Cobham, was never made to testify. See Berger, supra at
571. When Cobham's out-of-court statements-made during various government in-
terrogations-were admitted into evidence to be used against Raleigh, he objected,
asserting, "'Proof of the Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let
him speak it. Call my accuser before my face, and I have done."' Id. While commen-
tators have debated at length whether Sir Walter Raleigh's experience actually influ-
enced the Framers' decision to include the Confrontation Clause, it illustrates the
abusive practices endemic to common law criminal prosecution. See id.
10 SeeBerger, supra note 9, at 585-86.
" SeeLilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1894; see also FED. R. EVID. 804.
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v. United States.2 In Mattox, two central witnesses who had testi-
fied against the defendant at his first trial died before the sec-
ond trial commenced and were thus unavailable for cross-
examination at the second trial.3 The Court held that the tran-
scribed testimony and cross-examinations of the unavailable
witnesses from the first trial were admissible in the second trial. 4
The Court stated for the first time that the:
primary object of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions
or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases be-
ing used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportu-
nity,, not only testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the
witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in or-
der that they may look at him and judge by his demeanor upon the
stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is wor-
thy of belief.'5
The Court recognized, however, that particular situations
-require a court to admit statements from unavailable wit-
nesses despite the constitutional right to confrontation. 6 The
Court asserted that the Framers intended courts to make certain
exceptions where public policy warranted them. 7 A dying dec-
laration by a witness to a crime, the Court argued, was such an
exception. 8 The Court found that a statement made before
death was inherently reliable because one has no reason to lie
when facing death.' 9
Although the Mattox Court never mentioned "hearsay" in its
opinion, its decision created the first exception to the Confron-
tation Clause protections in criminal prosecution. ° Since Mat-
tox, the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the
evidentiary hearsay exceptions has plagued prosecutors, defen-
1 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
's See id. at 238.
'4 See id. at 248.
"Id. at 242.
"See id. at 243.
17 See id.
18 See id.
"See id. at 243-44.
"SeeBerger, supra note 9, at 591-92.
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dants, and trial courts.2 ' Despite the acknowledged exceptions,22
the Court maintains that the Confrontation Clause, essentially
the right to cross-examine one's accuser, is the foundation of
the truthseeking process.2' According to the Court, the trier of
fact cannot properly judge the accuser's nature or the circum-
stances surrounding the statement in the absence of a cross-
examination.24 In fact, the Court has asserted that the Confron-
tation Clause is the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth. '' 5
Although the Court continually emphasizes the importance
of the right to cross-examine one's accuser, its recent Confron-
tation Clause opinions have facilitated admission of accusatory
statements without cross-examination.26 Much of the Court's
leniency has come in decisions where it broadened its interpre-
tation of permissible unavailability.27 Seventy years after ruling
that statements made prior to death were admissible in Mattox,
the Court opined in Douglas v. Alabama28 that invoking one's
Fifth Amendment privileges also satisfied the unavailability re-
quirement of the hearsay rule.29
" Se4 e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805
(1990); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68 (1980); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
155 (1970); Mattox, 156 U.S. 237.
Congress codified the following exceptions to the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness: prior judicial testimony, statement under belief of impend-
ing death, statement against interest, statement of personal or family history, and for-
feiture by wrongdoing. FED. R. EviD. 804 (b).
"Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1894 (1999).
2 See Green, 399 U.S. at 161-62.
2 Id. at 158.
22 SeeBerger, supra note 9, at 558 n.4 (citations omitted).
See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 809 (1990) (finding a three year-old girl un-
available because she was "not capable of communicating to the jury"); Ohio v. Rob-
erts, 448 U.S. 56, 75 (1980) (stating that the prosecution must make a reasonable
good-faith effort to locate the declarant before establishing "constitutional unavail-
ability"); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 423 (1965) (concluding that invoking
one's Fifth Amendment privileges against self-incrimination makes a declarant un-
available to testify); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 260-61 (1895) (holding
that the death of the declarant is an acceptable exception to the constitutional right
to confrontation).
28380 U.S. 415 (1965).
29 Id. at 420-21.
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In Douglas, Loyd, an accomplice to the petitioner, invoked
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination" at the
petitioner's trial." In response, the judge granted the prosecu-
tion's motion to name Loyd a hostile witness, thus permitting
the prosecutor to cross-examine him. The prosecution pro-
ceeded to read Loyd his custodial confession sentence by sen-
tence and required Loyd to affirm or deny the veracity of the
statements.-3 The trial court found Douglas guilty and the Ala-
bama Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 5 The
Court held that by invoking his Fifth Amendment privileges,
Loyd was "unavailable" for trial. Further, admitting Loyd's
statement without affording the petitioner an opportunity to
cross-examine his accuser violated the petitioner's right to con-
frontation. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, asserted
that the truth of an accuser's statement is properly tested only
by cross-examination. Brennan supported his assertion by cit-
ing the Court's opinion in Mattox, where it emphasized the im-
portance of giving a jury the opportunity to consider whether
an accuser "is worthy of belief." Here, Brennan indicated, the
jury was denied the opportunity to hear Loyd's testimony. As a
result, the jury might have improperly construed the prosecu-
tor's reading of the testimony as the truth. Without affording
the defendant the right to cross-examine Loyd, the jury was un-
able to know if Loyd actually made the statements and whether
they were true.39 The Court opined that admission of Loyd's
"0 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides "No person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
"' See Douglas, 380 U.S. at 416. Loyd was tried first and found guilty, but he
planned to appeal his conviction. Accordingly, his attorney, also counsel to Douglas,
advised him to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. See id.
2 See id.
"See id.
"See id. at 417-18.
35 See id.
-" See id.
17 See id. at 420.
Id at 419 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)).
"9 See Douglas, 380 U.S. at 420.
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statements therefore violated the petitioner's Confrontation
Clause rights. °
While the Court recognized the need for exceptions to the
hearsay rule,41 application of the "against penal interest" excep-
tion 42 posed problems in cases where the declarant implicated
himself while also accusing the defendant of the same crime or
a more serious crime.3 Just three years after Douglas, in Bruton
v. United States, the declarant, Evans, confessed to committing
armed postal robbery with the defendant.44 In a joint trial, the
judge admitted into evidence Evans's confession that inculpated
the defendant in the robbery. 5 The judge gave the jury limiting
instructions to disregard Evans's statement when determining
Bruton's guilt, but despite the court's instructions, both Bruton
and Evans were found guilty.4 6  The Supreme Court reversed
Bruton's conviction and held that the admission violated the de-
fendant's right to confrontation because, despite the limiting
instructions, the risk was too great that the jury might have con-
sidered the co-defendant's confession when making its deci-
41sion.
' 0 Id. at 418. The Court also ruled in Douglas that the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment is applicable to the states. See id. (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965)).
,See, e.g., Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
4 The Federal Rules of Evidence define statements against penal interest as fol-
lows:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declar-
ant is unavailable as a wimess: ... (3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at
the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest,
or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a
claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to
expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not ad-
missible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement.
FED. R. Evm. 804(b) (3).
" See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
41 See id. at 124.
41 See id.
" See id. at 124-25. The Eighth Circuit affirmed Bruton's conviction because the
trial court judge relied on Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957) (holding that
limiting jury instructions protects a defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation
right, even in cases where an incriminating statement is admitted in full) and in-
structed the jury to disregard Evans' statement. The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to reconsider Delli Paoli and overruled it in Bruton. Id. at 126.
47 See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36.
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The Court's decision established the Bruton rule that re-
stricted limiting instructions in joint trials. 8 The Court sug-
gested that giving limiting instructions is equivalent to giving no
instructions to a jury.49 The Court recognized that its ruling
might hinder criminal prosecution in joint trials, but reasoned
that, in many cases, there are less harmful ways to prove the
confessor's guilt than by admitting a statement that incriminates
a co-defendant.50 The Court said that where the confessor's co-
defendant is denied the opportunity to cross-examine the de-
clarant, the jury cannot know if the confession was truthful or
an attempt to shift the blame to the co-defendant.5 1 The Court
held, therefore, that the admission of a co-defendant's state-
ment that inculpates the defendant, even if the jury is instructed
to ignore the incriminating portions, violates the defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights. 2
These earlier cases were important in shaping the way the
Court dealt with the admission of hearsay evidence, but they did
not instruct the courts below how to determine what is admissi-
ble under the Confrontation Clause.53 The Court finally estab-
lished a test in Ohio v. Roberts54 for determining admissibility of
out-of-court statements in the event the witness is "unavailable"
for trial.5 In Roberts, the respondent was charged with check
forgery and possession of stolen credit cards belonging to Ber-
nard and Amy Isaacs.56 At a preliminary hearing, Roberts called
57the Isaacs' daughter, Anita, as his only witness. During a
lengthy direct examination, Anita denied giving Roberts the
checks and credit cards. 8 At Roberts' jury trial a year later,
"' See id. at 137.
9 See id.
50 See id. at 133-34.
s' See id. at 136.
52 See id.
's See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980). In this line of cases, "the Court
has not sought to 'map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that would deter-
mine the validity of all... hearsay exceptions."' Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 162 (1970)). See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Douglas
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957);
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
s 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).






Roberts testified that Anita gave him use of her father's checks
and credit cards.59 Anita, however, did not appear at trial and
her parents maintained that they did not know where she re-
sided6 The trial court found her "unavailable" for trial and
admitted her preliminary hearing testimony over the respon-
dent's objection that it violated his Confrontation Clause
rights. 1 After conducting a voir dire hearing as to the admissi-
bility of Anita's preliminary hearing testimony, the court ruled
that Anita was unavailable because no one, including her par-
ents, knew how to reach her.62 The Supreme Court of Ohio
held that Anita was not unavailable and "the mere opportunity
to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing did not afford consti-
tutional confrontation for purposes of trial."63 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the rela-
tionship between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule
exceptions and reversed. 4
The Court held that Anita was, in fact, constitutionally un-
available for respondent's trial because the prosecution made a
good faith effort to locate her before the trial.65 The Court also
held that the preliminary hearing afforded the respondent an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness and that the
transcript "bore sufficient indicia of reliability" to provide the
trier of fact with "a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of
the prior statement."6
The Roberts Court took this opportunity to erect a two-
pronged inquiry for determining when statements admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rule also satisfy the Confron-
tation Clause. First, the prosecution must demonstrate that
the declarant is unavailable to testify.' Once unavailability is
proven and the necessity of the statement is determined, the
59 Id. at 59.
'0 See id. at 60. Between November 1975 and March 1976, five subpoenas for four
different trial dates were sent to Anita at her parents' address. She never responded
to the subpoenas. See id.
61 See id. at 73, 77.
62 See id. at 60.
63 Id. at 61.
61 See id. at 62.
See id. at 76-77.
66 Id. at 65-66 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).




statement must be deemed to be sufficiently reliable to make
the right to confrontation unnecessary.6 A statement is suffi-
ciently dependable if: (1) it falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay
exception"; or (2) it contains "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness, such that adversarial testing would be expected
to add little, if anything, to the statements' reliability." The
Court has continued to shape the Roberts test into a useful tool
for determining reliability in cases where the witness is unavail-
able to testify.71
Six years after Roberts in Lee v. Illinois,72 the Court utilized the
Roberts test to determine whether a confession by a co-defendant
was admissible in ajoint trial.73 In this case, the petitioner, Lee,
and her boyfriend, Thomas, were tried jointly in a bench trial
for a double murder; neither Lee nor Thomas testified.74 In
proving Lee guilty of the murders, the prosecutor depended
heavily on portions of Thomas's police confession obtained at
the time of the arrest.75 The appeals court affirmed the use of
the confession because the co-defendants' stories "interlocked,"
suggesting reliability.76 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed, however, and held that admission of Thomas's confes-
sion violated Lee's right to confrontation.7 The Court followed
the analysis set forth in Roberts and concluded that accomplice
statements in general are presumptively suspect and in this case
the circumstances surrounding the statement did not provide
sufficient indicia of reliability to override the presumption. 78
The Court also asserted that "a confession is not necessarily
rendered reliable simply because some of the facts it contains
69 See id.
" Id. at 66. The Court did not define "firmly rooted." See Goldman, supra note 9,
at 3. Since Roberts, courts have referred to the second prong as the "residual admissi-
bility test" to suggest that a statement not falling into a firmly rooted exception must
satisfy this test to be admitted into evidence under the Confrontation Clause. Lilly v.
Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1899 (1999).
7, Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1894.
476 U.S. 530 (1986).
73 See id. at 543, 546.
71 See id. at 531.
75 See id.
71 Id. at 538.
77 See id. at 547.
7 Id. at 546.
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'interlock' with the facts in the defendant's statement." The
Court established that a co-defendant's or accomplice's confes-
sion inculpating the accused is presumptively unreliable and
violates the accused's right to confrontation.' °
The Court followed its reasoning in Lee regarding selective
reliability in a case involving the admissibility of a child's state-
ment to a medical examiner." In Idaho v. Wright,82 Laura Lee
Wright was convicted on two counts of lewd conduct with a mi-
nor under the age of sixteen.8s At Wright's trial, a voir dire
hearing revealed that Wright's three-year-old daughter was un-
able to testify. 4 The court permitted the doctor who examined
the young girl to testify about the younger daughter's state-
ment. The court admitted the doctor's testimony under
Idaho's residual hearsay exception86 and a jury found her
guilty.87 Wright appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court and ar-
gued, inter alia, that her Confrontation Clause rights were vio-
lated because the statements did not fall within a firmly rooted
79 Id. at 545. The Court found that the statements differed on the material issues,
specifically the roles the two defendants played in the murder and the question of
premeditation. See id. at 546.
80 See id. at 546. The Court also noted that "the arrest statements of a co-defendant
have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion." Id. at 541 (internal quotations
omitted).
", SeeIdaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 824 (1990).
82 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
See id. at 808. Wright was jointly charged and tried with Robert L. Giles for lewd
conduct with Wright's two daughters, ages 5 1/2 and 2 1/2, in violation of IDAHO
CODE § 18-1508 (1987). They were convicted on both counts. Wright and Giles ap-
pealed only the conviction for lewd conduct with Wright's 2 1/2 year-old daughter.
Giles unsuccessfully appealed on the basis that the trial court erred in admitting the
doctor's testimony under the residual hearsay exception. Wright, however, argued
that the admission under the residual hearsay exception violated her Confrontation
Clause rights. See id at 812.
84 See id. at 809.
8' See id.
'6 Rule 803 provides in part,
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equiva-
lent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests
ofjustice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
IDAHO IL EVID. 803(24).
87 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 812.
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hearsay exception and the interview lacked substantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed and
reversed her conviction.9 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and affirmed.9°
The Court held that the medical examiner's testimony reit-
erating statements made by Wright's younger daughter violated
Wright's Confrontation Clause protections.9' Using the Roberts
test, the Court reasoned that Idaho's residual hearsay exception
was not a firmly rooted exception and that the young girl's
statements lacked the particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness necessary to satisfy the requirements of the Clause.92 The
Court stated that corroborating evidence does not make a
statement more reliable. 93 Instead the statement at issue must
bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" on its own
merits. Admitting hearsay statements simply because other
evidence corroborates them, the Court said, would permit
"bootstrapping" of presumptively unreliable evidence onto the
trustworthiness of other evidence at trial.95 The Court, however,
did not establish a per se rule excluding statements made by de-
clarants unable to communicate to the jury at the time of trial.96
The Court argued that a "per se rule of exclusion would not
only frustrate the truthseeking purpose of the Confrontation
Clause, but would also hinder States in their own 'enlightened
development in the law of evidence.' 9 7 The Court maintained
that lower courts must engage in a factual determination of the
trustworthiness of each statement on its own merits.98
In White v. illinois,99 the Court again tried to clarify its inter-
pretation of hearsay exceptions under a Confrontation Clause
sSee id.
See id. at 813.
90 See id.
9' See id. at 827.
9 See id.
93 See id. at 822.
94 Id.
"See id. at 823.
See id. at 825.
7 Id. (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan,J., concurring in re-
sult)).
Id.
"502 U.S. 346 (1992).
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analysis.' ° In White, S.G., a four-year-old girl told several people,
including her mother, her doctor, and a friend, that the peti-
tioner had sexually assaulted her.10' Her confidants testified at
the petitioner's trial and recounted her statements.' 2 The trial
court admitted S.G.'s hearsay statements under Illinois' "spon-
taneous declaration" exception.0 3 The Court held that her
statements were admissible because they were made in a context
"that provide[s] substantial guarantees of their trustworthi-
ness." 
4
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court and quickly re-
jected petitioner's argument that the Court should limit its in-
terpretation of "witness against" to cases analogous to the abuses
common in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries.05 The
Court argued that such a narrow reading of the Confrontation
Clause "would virtually eliminate [the Clause's] role in restrict-
ing the admission of hearsay testimony."1' 6 The Court sought
instead to "steer a middle course" that permits certain excep-
107tions to the hearsay rule when appropriate. The Court recog-
nized that certain statements of unavailable witnesses should be
admitted if they fit within "firmly rooted exceptions" to the
hearsay rule and are thus so trustworthy that cross-examination
would add little or no value for the trier of fact.'08 The Court
reasoned that exceptions become firmly rooted as, over time,
courts recognize that the context in which the statements are
made suggest "substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness."' 9
The Court stated, however, that despite the permissive use of
hearsay statements in cases where the statement was a sponta-
neous declaration, in cases where a co-defendant or accomplice
"0 See id. at 348.
'o' See id. at 349.
0 See id. at 350.
113 See id. The trial court agreed with the prosecutor that the girl was too young to
testify but that her statements provided sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness ren-
dering cross-examination of her unnecessary. See id.
Id. at 355.
105 See id. at 352. References to prosecuting using the admission of ex parte affida-
vits while never producing the affiants at trial. See id.
106 Id.
117 Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68 n.9 (1980)).
'08 Id. at 353.
'09 Id. at 355.
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inculpates the defendant, testimony is preferred because cross-
examination is the most effective tool in unveiling the'truth."0
Justice Thomas wrote separately in White, concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment." Justice Thomas argued that
the Court's current Confrontation Clause jurisprudence differs
from the Framers' intent. 112 He contended that this line of Su-
preme Court cases "unnecessarily ha[s] complicated and con-
fused the relationship between the constitutional right of
confrontation and the hearsay rules of evidence.""s He sug-
gested that the Framers intended a more narrow reading of
"witness against" to include only those individuals who testify at
trial, not merely people who saw the crime.'' Justice Thomas
suggested that statements made by a "witness against" the ac-
cused should also incorporate extrajudicial testimony, including
affidavits, depositions, and custodial confessions. ' Justice
Thomas concluded that historical evidence does not support
the "notion that the Confrontation Clause was intended to con-
stitutionalize the hearsay'rule and its exceptions.""
6
Not surprisingly, the Court granted certiorari just two years
after White in another attempt to clarify its position regarding
the admission of "against penal interest" statements."7 In Wil-
liamson v. United States,"8 Reginald Harris was stopped by the po-
lice for weaving on the highway."9 The police searched his car,
discovered cocaine, and arrested him." Harris confessed to a
Drug Enforcement Administration agent that he was transport-
11 Id. at 356. The Court distinguished this case from Roberts and recognized that
spontaneous declarations have proven more reliable than statements made by ac-
complices as part of ajudicial proceeding. See id.
. Id. at 358 (Thomas,J, concurring).
112 See id. (Thomas,J, concurring).
"s Id. (ThomasJ, concurring).
... See id. at 359 (ThomasJ, concurring).
... See id. at 365 (Thomas,J, concurring).
"c Id. at 366. Justice Thomas's position was argued in Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct.
1887 (1999), in an attempt to limit the admission of Mark Lilly's statement, butJus-
tice Stevens quickly rejected it. See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 189.
"7 SeeWilliamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994). Williamsonwas not a Con-
frontation Clause case, but the Court's discussion of the "against penal interest" hear-
say exception is important to this analysis.
. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).




ing the cocaine for his accomplice, Williamson.' Williamson
later was arrested and tried for various drug offenses. 22  Al-
though Harris fully incriminated himself as an accomplice dur-
ing his police confession, he refused to testify at Williamson's
trial123 The trial court allowed the DEA agent to recount the
confession to the jury under the "against penal interest excep-
tion. ,124 The Supreme Court reversed the decision and held
that Rule 804(b) (3), the "against penal interest" exception, did
not permit the admission of non-self-inculpating statements
even if they were contained in a statement that is self-
inculpating on the whole.'t s The Court argued that self-
inculpation did not make the non-self-inculpatory statement
more credible, particularly where the declarant accuses another
of a more serious crime. In fact, a reasonable person might
try to mask the exculpatory language with a general statement
127implicating him or herself for the less serious crime.
The Court noted that its decision to bar admission of any
non-self-inculpating statements would limit the prosecutors'
ability to use custodial confessions during trial, but it suggested
that truly self-inculpating statements would continue to be ad-
missible. The Court recommended reviewing the context in
which the statement was made in determining whether it can be
classified as an exception.'2 The Court carefully removed the
ability of accomplices and co-defendants to bury self-
exculpating statements in a self-inculpating confession, thus re-
storing some of the constitutional guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment!"°
Despite this line of cases, litigants and courts continue to
struggle with the relationship between the Confrontation Clause
12 See id. 596-97.
'2 See id. at 597.
12 See id.
121 See id. at 598.
'2' See id. at 600. See supra note 42 for the text of Rule 804(b) (3).
126 See id. at 599.
"27 See id. at 600.
28 See id. at 603.
" See id. at 604. The Court appeared to adopt the Roberts test in its inquiry as to
whether "a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the
statement unless believing it to be true." Id.
.. See id. at 605.
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and hearsay exceptions.'31 Justice Harlan suggested almost
thirty years ago in California v. Green that the Court needed to
clarify its instructions to the lower courts as to how to determine
admissibility of out-of-court statements. 2 Lilly v. Virginia repre-
sents another effort by the Court to clarify this complex rela-
tionship.33
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 4, 1995, Benjamin Lilly, Petitioner, his
brother Mark Lilly, the declarant, and Mark Lilly's roommate
Gary Wayne Barker embarked on a twenty-four hour crime
spree that culminated in the carjacking and murder of Alex De-
Filippis on December 5, 1995.'3 The crime spree began when
the three men, who had been drinking and smoking marijuana
at Petitioner's home, drove in Petitioner's car to the home of
Danny Sanders, a friend of Petitioner.13 5 When they arrived,
Sanders was not there.ls They broke into his home and stole
several bottles of liquor, a safe, and three guns.13 ' They then
went to the home of another friend, Warren Nolan, where they
'3' Although the Roberts tests purports to instruct lower courts in their determina-
tions of admissibility, determinations by state and federal courts are often challenged
and reversed. See Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1893 (1999) (stating that the Su-
preme Court of Virginia's decision "represented a significant departure from our
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence"); see also American Civil Liberties Union Brief as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 17, Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999)
(No. 98-5881) (arguing that lower courts have tremendous leeway to admit hearsay
statements subject to review only in the rare case in which the Supreme Court grants
certiorari); Charles F. Williams, Tangled Up In Tape: Accomplice's Blame-Shifting Recorded
Confession Tests Sixth Amendment, 85 A.BA. J. 36 (May 1999) (stating that prosecutors
often argue to appellate courts that the self-inculpatory nature of a confession is a
fact-based determination to protect the statements from appellate review).
11' See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 172 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Harlan argued that the Framers' intent when drafting the Sixth Amendment has
been lost in the complexities of the hearsay rule. Several cases dealing with redaction
illustrate these inconsistencies. See, e.g., Gray v. Maryland, 118 S. Ct. 1151 (1998);
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968).
See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1893.
1 See id. at 1892.
"' See Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999) (No. 98-
5881).
" See id.
,s7 See id.; see also Lilly v. Virginia, 499 S.E.2d. 522, 565 (Va. 1998).
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tried unsuccessfully to "trade the guns for some dope."'' 8 After
Barker stated that "he would shoot the police if they attempted
to arrest him,"'' 9 Nolan's girlfriend asked them to leave.1 40 The
three men then drove to the trailer where Mark Lilly and Barker
rented a room and proceeded to "'drink all night."' 4
The following morning, the three men left the trailer and
drove around the countryside. They stopped at the home of
Mike Lang, another friend of Mark Lilly and Barker, and asked
him to join them. Lang's mother, however, refused to let Lang
go with Mark Lilly and Barker after Barker stated in front of her
'43that he could kill his best friend and not feel remorse.
After they left Lang's house, Petitioner, Mark Lilly, and
Barker drove around the area, drank the stolen liquor, robbed a
convenience store, and shot geese with the stolen guns. 44 Later
that day, they drove back to the trailer where they again tried
unsuccessfully to sell or trade the stolen pistol for marijuana.'45
They then drove to a bar where Mark Lilly unsuccessfully tried
to sell the rifle to a co-worker.
46
Early that evening, as Petitioner, Mark Lilly, and Barker
cruised around the countryside, Petitioner's car broke down.
47
He coasted down a hill and stopped across the street from a
convenience store where the three men took the license plates
off the car and removed the guns.4 8 They intended to hide the
guns and the license plates in the woods until they could find
another car to use. Meanwhile, DeFilippis and his college
roommate arrived at the convenience store at approximately the
same time.59 When DeFilippis's roommate went into the store,
" Joint Appendix at 105-107, Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999) (No. 98-
5881).
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DeFilippis waited in the parking lot.151 Petitioner approached
DeFilippis, pointed the gun at him and demanded his money.1
2
DeFilippis gave Petitioner his wallet.15 1 Petitioner then called to
Mark Lilly and Barker and told them to get in DeFilippis's car.54
He told DeFilippis to sit in the back seat with Mark Lilly. 55 Peti-
tioner quickly drove out of the parking lot, but did not disclose
where the four men were going. As they drove, DeFilippis re-
peatedly asked Petitioner to return to the convenience store so
he could pick up his roommate.55 DeFilippis also offered to
drive Petitioner wherever he wanted to go.'5 Petitioner ignored
DeFilippis's requests and instead drove to a deserted piece of
property.' 58 When Petitioner stopped the car, Mark Lilly and
Barker told DeFilippis to close his eyes so he could not look at
their faces. 59 The four men exited the car and Mark Lilly told
DeFilippis to start walking).' Petitioner shouted after him to
take off all of his clothes.'" After DeFilippis started walking and
Mark Lilly and Barker returned to the car, Petitioner demanded
that Mark Lilly give him the stolen .38 caliber pistol.6 1 Mark
Lilly gave him the pistol and instead of getting into the car, Peti-
tioner ran after DeFilippis into the woods.1 63 DeFilippis was shot
four times; three shots were to his head and one went through
his forearm.'r DeFilippis died quickly after being shot in the
brain.' When Petitioner returned to the car, he told Mark Lilly
and Barker that DeFilippis had seen his face, so he had to shoot

















him.'6 He allegedly told the two, "'I've been to the penitentiary
and I ain't going back.'
167
The men subsequently drove to the river to discard the
items they believed had their fingerprints on them, including
DeFilippis's clothes and backpack and the plastic cover on the
speedometer.ee Soon thereafter, the three men robbed two
more convenience stores. 169 The owner of the second store fol-
lowed Petitioner, Mark Lilly, and Barker and reported to the po-
lice the license plate number of the car stolen from
DeFilippis.17' Driving awa from the second store, however, the
stolen car broke down. The police arrived on the scene
shortly after the car stopped.7 2 When the police arrived, Mark
Lilly and Barker fled into the woods and Petitioner stayed in the
173car.
The police arrested Petitioner for the two convenience store
robberies'74 and held him at the scene for about two hours.75
Approximately ten to thirty minutes later, the police found
Barker a few yards from the road sitting with the rifle pointed at
his head.76 The police convinced him to surrender and took
him immediately to the station for questioning.7 7 Several hours
later, Petitioner called to his brother on a loud speaker and en-
couraged him to come out of the woods.17s Petitioner yelled,




69 SeeLilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1892 (1999).
,7' See Respondent's Brief at 5, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
"7 See id.
7 See id.; see also Petitioner's Brief at 5, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
'7 See Respondent's Brief at 5, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
'7 See id. at 6. The robberies were the only crimes the police knew about at the
time. See id.
'75 See Petitioner's Brief at 5, Lilly (No. 98-5881). While Petitioner was waiting in
the car, he allegedly asked one of the officers to "put the barrel of the officer's shot-
gun in his mouth and pull the trigger." Respondent's Brief at 6, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
When the officer refused and asked Petitioner something to the effect of "what does a
murderer look like?," Petitioner responded, "me." Id.
176 See Petitioner's Brief at 5, Lilly (No. 98-5881); see also Respondent's Brief at 5-6,
Lilly (No. 98-5881).




the one that's really done anything wrong."'' 7 9 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the police found Mark Lilly walking along the road.'8 °
When apprehended, Mark Lilly falsely identified himself as
Mark Rader.' The police took Mark Lilly to the police station
for questioning.
8 2
At the police station, Barker was interrogated first, begin-
ning at 9:47 P.M.' 3 He was very emotional but "recounted in de-
tail what had happened, including the fact that Ben Lilly had
shot and killed Alex DeFilippis."'1' Barker also directed the po-
lice to DeFilippis's body and told them where to find his
clothes.""
After the police finished questioning Barker, they informed
Mark Lilly that Barker and Petitioner both stated that he [Mark
Lilly] was not the triggerman 86 The audio tape of the investiga-
tion indicates that the police questioned Mark Lilly from 1:35
A.M. until 2:12 A.M. and again between 2:30 and 2:53 A.M.
8 7
Mark Lilly repeatedly told the officers that he was drunk during
the entire spree. He confessed to participating in the thefts of
the alcohol, but told the police that he was simply present dur-
ing the more serious robberies and the homicide.1'8 Upon
prompting by police to "break family ties" to avoid a life sen-
tence, Mark Lilly admitted that Petitioner instigated the carjack-
ing and that he [Mark Lilly] did not have anything to do with
the shooting. ' 9 Mark Lilly also told the police that Petitioner
"was the one who shot DeFilippis."' 9
Petitioner was questioned last. 9' He maintained that there
were three other accomplices including Mark Lilly, Barker, and




,s2 SeePetitioner's Brief at 5, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
, See id. at 6.
Respondent's Brief at 7, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
"8 See id.
6 See Petitioner's Brief at 6, Lilly (No. 98-5881).








car.193 He claimed that he was forced at gunpoint to participate
in the robberies, but made no mention of stealing the guns
from Sanders's home. 4  Petitioner also did not mention the
murder and robbery of DeFilippis115  After the interrogation,
Petitioner refused to submit to a gunshot residue test and im-
mediately rubbed his hands together and on his pants.'
6
The physical evidence supported Mark Lilly and Barker's
stories. 197 Blood was found on Petitioner's jeans, although the
amount was too small for a DNA test.98 The bullet recovered
from DeFilippis's head matched the .38 caliber revolver that was
stolen from Sanders' home.1
The Commonwealth of Virginia charged Petitioner with
several offenses, including the murder of DeFilippis.2 0° He was
tried separately.' At Petitioner's trial, Barker testified against
Petitioner and accused him of shooting DeFilippis.2 02 Mark
Lilly, however, invoked his right against self-incrimination un-
der the Fifth Amendment and refused to testify. 3 In response,
the Commonwealth moved to admit Mark Lilly's custodial con-
fession and argued it was admissible under the hearsay excep-
tion for "declarations of an unavailable witness against penal
interest."204 Petitioner objected and argued that the statements
were not self-inculpatory because they shifted blame for the
See id.
'9 See id. at 7-8.
195 See id.




' SeeLilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1892 (1999).
201 See id.
' See Respondent's Brief at 8-9, Lilly (No. 98-5881). Barker had entered into a
plea bargain with the Commonwealth and was required to testify. See Record at 29,
Lilly (No. 98-5881). According to the Commonwealth, Barker's testimony and cross-
examination "mirrored the confession given by Mark [Lilly] in all material respects
except that it contained far greater detail about petitioner's actions." Respondent's
Brief at 8, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
213 See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1892-93. Mark Lilly had not yet been tried for his involve-
ment in the crimes. Thus, the Commonwealth still had the power to implicate him as
the "triggerman" subjecting him to charges of capital murder if he changed his story
under oath at Benjamin Lilly's trial. See Brief for the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioner at 10-11, Lilly v. Virginia,
119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999) (No. 98-5881).
23 See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1893.
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murder to Petitioner and admission of the statements would vio-
late Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 5
The court overruled the objection and admitted Mark Lilly's
confessional statements in their entirety.
2 6
The jury found Petitioner guilty of robbery, abduction, car-
jacking, possession of a firearm by a felon, and four counts of il-
legal use of a firearm, and sentenced him to two consecutive life
terms plus twenty-seven years for these crimes.20 7 The jury also
found Petitioner guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to
death.0
On petition to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Petitioner
argued that pursuant to Virginia state law, the "against penal in-
terest" hearsay exception never should apply to evidence of-
fered by the Commonwealth against the defendant.2 9
Petitioner also argued that according to Virginia case law, Mark
Lilly's statements were not against his penal interest.21 Al-
though Petitioner's arguments were based on state, not federal
law, he cited Lee v. Illinois and Williamson v. United States in his
reply brief to support his argument that accomplice statements
are presumptively unreliable.2 1 1 The Supreme Court of Virginia
rejected Petitioner's arguments and affirmed the trial court's
decision on April 17, 19982 The court held that Mark Lilly's
custodial confession did not violate Petitioner's Confrontation
Clause rights.2 1 3 The court reasoned that Mark Lilly's confession
was a declaration against penal interest because he implicated




20' See id. It is well established under Virginia law that "only the person who is the
immediate perpetrator [of the killing] may be a principal in the first degree and thus
liable to conviction for capital murder." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 255 S.E.2d 525,
527 (Va. 1979) (interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18), quoted in Brief of National As-
sociation of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioner at 15-
16, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
See Respondent's Brief at 12, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
2,0 See id. at 13.
21 See id.
2'2 Lilly v. Virginia, 499 S.E.2d 522, 537 (Va. 1998).
213 See id. at 534.
21, See id. The Court stated that the lower court's determination that Mark Lilly's
statement was self-serving goes to the weight the jury could assign to the statement
and not to its admissibility. See id.
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that Mark Lilly's hearsay statements had "sufficient guarantees
of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule" thus "adversarial testing would add little to its reli-
ability."
215
Benjamin Lilly petitioned the Supreme Court of Virginia for
a rehearing.216 He argued that the Confrontation Clause pro-
hibited the admission of a custodial confession because that
hearsay exception was not firmly rooted and, pursuant to Idaho
v. Wright,217 the court should not consider corroborating evi-
dence as validation of Mark Lilly's statements .21  The Virginia
Supreme Court denied the petition for rehearing on June 5,
1998, in an unpublished, summary order.1 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on
November 9, 1998, to resolve whether the accused's Confronta-
tion Clause rights were "violated by admitting into evidence at
his trial a nontestifying accomplice's entire confession that con-
tained some statements against the accomplice's penal interest
and others that inculpated the accused., 22' The Court stated
that the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision conflicted with
the United States Supreme Court's history of Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence and warranted the Court's review.22'
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE PLURALITY OPINION
Writing for the plurality,222 Justice Stevens reversed the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Virginia and held that the admis-
sion of Mark Lilly's custodial confession violated petitioner's
Confrontation Clause rights.223 Justice Stevens asserted that
"'accomplices' confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant
215 Id.
216 See Respondent's Brief at 18, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
2,7 497 U.S. 805 (1990)
2.. See Respondent's Brief at 18, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
219 See id.
"Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1892 (1999).
22 See id. at 1893.
'Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souterjoined in all parts of the opinion. Justice
Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment and
Parts I and II. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment and Part I. Chief Justice
Rehnquist andJustices O'Connor and Kennedy concurred with the judgment.
223 See id. at 1901.
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are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as
that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause ju-
risprudence. Justice Stevens also held that appellate courts
should independently review the government's proffered guar-
antees of trustworthiness under the second half of the Roberts
inquiry.2t
Justice Stevens asserted in Part II of the opinion that the
Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case despite the
Commonwealth of Virginia's claim to the contrary.226 Although
Petitioner had focused on state hearsay law in his appeal to the
Supreme Court of Virginia, he argued in his brief to that court
that the admission of Mark Lilly's statements violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation.227 Petitioner also cited Lee
v. Illinois228 and Williamson v. United States' in his reply brief to
the Supreme Court of Virginia.2° Justice Stevens concluded
that these references to United States Supreme Court opinions
were sufficient to raise the constitutional issue of confrontation
in the court below, and the Supreme Court therefore had juris-
diction over this case.23'
Having established jurisdiction, Justice Stevens asserted in
Part III that admission of Mark Lilly's statements raised a Con-
frontation Clause issue. The Court adhered to its holding in
Roberts and reiterated that hearsay statements are admissible
where the declarant is unavailable and the statement falls within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception or contains "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" sufficient to satisfy the Clause's
residual admissibility test. s5 The Roberts test supports the prem-
ise that a defendant must be allowed to confront his accusers
2" Id. at 1899.
225 See id. at 1900. The second prong of the Roberts test asks whether the truth of
hearsay statements is sufficiently dependable to allow the untested admission of such
statements against the accused if it contains "particularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness" such that cross-examination would add little to the statement's reliability.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). This test is often called the "residual trust-
worthiness" test. See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1899-1900.
" See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1893.
2 See id.
476 U.S. 530 (1986).
512 U.S. 594 (1994).
2" See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1893.
"' See id.




unless adversarial testing would add little to the reliability of the
statements.3 4
Justice Stevens acknowledged the argument made most re-
cently in White v. Illinois2 5 for a narrow reading of the Confron-
tation Clause, particularly with respect to the phrase "witnesses
against. ,216 Justice Stevens maintained, however, that the right
to confrontation should not be limited only to preventing prac-
tices analogous to. prosecution by ex parte affidavits. 3  The
Court concluded that such a narrow reading of "witnesses"
"would have virtually eliminated the Clause's role in restricting
the admission of hearsay testimony," something the Court was
unprepared to do.s Justice Stevens noted, however, that Mark
Lilly's statements were analogous to the use of ex parte affidavits
because they were obtained by police with the intention of using
them as evidence at a future trial239 Accordingly, Justice Stevens
concluded that admission of Mark Lilly's statements raised a
Confrontation Clause issue regardless of the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Clause's language.
Justice Stevens applied the first prong of the Roberts test to
Mark Lilly's confession in Part IV and held that his statements
did not fall within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay
rule.241 Although the Commonwealth of Virginia argued that his
" See id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992).
25 See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1894. The issue before the Court in White and in California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), was whether the Confrontation Clause should be used
only to protect against the abuses endemic to "16th- and 17th-century England:
prosecuting a defendant through the presentation of ex parte affidavits, without the
affiants ever being produced at trial." White, 502 U.S. at 352. The Court held that
this narrow reading of the Confrobtation Clause would "virtually eliminate [the
Clause's] role in restricting the admission of hearsay testimony" as permitted by Su-
preme Court precedent. Id.
7 see Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1894..
Id. See also White, 502 U.S. at 352, where the Court rejected the request to nar-
rowly interpret the Clause and instead relied on Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980),
where the Court focused on the reliability of the statement.
239 Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1894. This theory of the Confrontation Clause's origin has
been debated and challenged. See Berger, supra note 9, at 568-86; Jonakait, supra
note 9, at 77-79. Regardless of the origin, however, Mark Lilly's statements meet the
criteria typically used for Confrontation Clause analysis. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1894.
240 See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1894.
24 See id. at 1894-98. Justice Stevens conceded that the confession must have in-
cluded statements against Mark Lilly's penal interest according to Virginia state law.
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confession was admissible under the "against penal interest" ex-
ception,24 jJustice Stevens indicated that accomplice confessions
that incriminate a defendant "fall outside the realm of those
'hearsay exception[s] [that are] so trustworthy that adversarial
testing can be expected to add little to [the statements'] reliabil-
ity.",
The "against penal interest" exception proposed by the
Commonwealth in Lilly is based on the presumption that a per-
son is unlikely to lie to inculpate himself.24 In Lee v. llinos,
245
however, the Court determined that the simple characterization
of "against penal interest" defines a class too large for Confron-
tation Clause analysis.246 Justice Stevens, therefore, discussed
three common scenarios where the "against penal interest" ex-
ception is invoked in criminal cases.247 He stated that the excep-
tion is invoked when hearsay statements are offered into
evidence:
(1) as voluntary admissions against the declarant; (2) as exculpatory evi-
dence offered by a defendant who claims that the declarant committed,
or was involved in, the offense; and (3) as evidence offered by theprose-
cution to establish guilt of an alleged accomplice of the declarant.
According to Justice Stevens, Mark Lilly's statements fall
under the third general category, where the government seeks
to introduce a statement by an accomplice that incriminates the
defendant.249 This category presents particular problems to the
Court.250 First, admission of these statements under the "against
penal interest" exception is of "fairly recent vintage."25 Second,
it typically includes statements that when "offered in the ab-
sence of the declarant function similarly to those used in the
See id. at 1894. He stated that the question for this Court was whether the statements
were admissible under the Confrontation Clause. See id.
242 See id. at 1894.
243 See id. at 1898.
" See id. at 1895.
245 476 U.S. 530 (1986)
246 Id. at 544 n.5.
217 Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1895.
248 Id.




ancient ex parte affidavit system., '252 Third, statements admitted
under this category are often "inherently unreliable. " 5s3
Justice Stevens contended that the Supreme Court has
viewed accomplice statements with suspicion for almost a cen-
tury.24 In Crawford v. United States,25' the Court first stated its dis-
trust of accomplice statements that inculpate the declarant and
the defendant 6 It stated that statements inculpating the de-
clarant and the defendant together "ought not to be passed
upon by the jury under the same rules governing other and ap-
parently credible witnesses. ''257 Since Crawford, the Court has
"spoken with one voice in declaring presumptively unreliable
accomplice confessions that incriminate defendants."25'
According to Justice Stevens, the Court's holdings in Craw-
ford, Douglas, Lee, White, and Williamson demonstrated its reluc-
tance to admit into evidence presumptively unreliable
statements made by accomplices that often demonstrate blame-
shifting and self-exculpation259 Therefore, he concluded, ac-
complice statements are less credible than most ordinary hear-
say evidence.2r o Accordingly, because the premise of permitting
hearsay exceptions is based on the notion that certain state-
ments "carr[y] special guarantees of credibility,, 26' accomplice
statements incriminating a defendant do not meet this crite-
262rion. Justice Stevens held, therefore, that "accomplices' con-
fessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has




25 212 U.S. 183 (1909).
2"6 See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1897.
27 Id. (quoting Crawford, 212 U.S. at 204) (quotations omitted).
I&/ (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986)). Justice Stevens pro-
ceeded to discuss the holdings in Douglas, Lee, and Williamson to further illustrate the
consistency in the Court's opinions on this issue. See id. at 1897-98.
2" See id. at 1897.
See id. at 1898.
261 Id. at 1895 (quoting White, 502 U.S. at 356)).
212 Id. at 1898.
26 Id. at 1899. Justice Stevens asserted that this case made "explicit what was here-
tofore implicit.'" Id. at 1899 n.5. Justice Stevens noted that this decision reaffirmed
the holdings in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S.
186 (1987), Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998), and Lee v. illinois, 476 U.S. 530
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Under the Roberts test, if a statement does not fall within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception, it must bear particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness such that adversarial testing would
add little to its reliability, thus satisfying the residual admissibil-
ity test.26 In Part V, Justice Stevens held that it is "highly un-
likely" that the government will be able to rebut the
presumptive unreliability attached to accomplices' custodial
confessions necessary to satisfy the Roberts residual admissibility
test.
21
Justice Stevens concluded that the circumstances surround-
ing Mark Lilly's statements did not provide a guarantee of
trustworthiness that would have made a cross-examination su-
perfluous.26 Justice Stevens rejected the Commonwealth's posi-
tion that Mark Lilly's statements were trustworthy simply
because (1) Gary Barker's testimony and the physical evidence
corroborated Mark Lilly's statements; (2) the police read Mark
Lilly his Miranda rights before he made his statements and thus
Mark appreciated the seriousness of his accusation; and (3)
Mark implicated himself in other serious crimes.6 7 A determi-
nation regarding whether a hearsay statement has particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness is a mixed question of fact and
constitutional law.2 8 Appellate courts, therefore, have a respon-
sibility to review de novo lower courts' determinations of the
trustworthiness of a custodial statement.26 9 The tendency for ac-
complices to shift or spread blame makes it difficult for prose-
cutors to overcome the presumptive unreliability the Court has
attached to accomplice confessions.270
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens analyzed the circumstances
surrounding Mark Lilly's statements to determine their trust-
(1986), where the court found that accomplice confessions that inculpate a defen-
dant are not per se admissible, even if they include a statement or statements that in-
criminate the declarant. See Lilly, 119 S. Ct at 1899.
See Lilly, 119 S. Ct at 1899.
26 See id.
"4 See id. at 1901.
27 See id. at 1899.
ms Id. at 1900.
269 Id.
271 l& See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599-601 (1994) ("[N]on-
self-inculpatory portions of a statement are presumptively unreliable."); Lee v. Illi-
nois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) ("[W]hen one person accuses another of a crime un-
der circumstances where the declarant stands to gain by inculpating another, the
accusation is presumptively suspect. ... ").
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worthiness in light of the presumption of unreliability. First, he
rejected the claim that Mark Lilly's statement was sufficiently re-
liable simply because the other evidence, including Barker's tes-
timony, corroborated the story.27' Justice Stevens argued that in
Wright, the Court held that "hearsay evidence used to convict a
defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its in-
herent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at
trial
272
Justice Stevens also dismissed the Commonwealth's argu-
ment that Mark Lilly's statements were more reliable because
the police informed him of his Miranda rights. 73 The Court
concluded that knowledge of one's rights typically has very little
bearing on the truth of one's statements when the declarant is
being questioned about her involvement in a serious crime. 4
Third, the Court rejected the Commonwealth's argument
that Mark Lilly must have been telling the truth simply because
he implicated himself in the crime spree.2 Justice Stevens as-
serted that a confession that includes self-inculpating statements
does not make the non-self-inculpating portions more credi-
ble. 6 In this case, specifically, the police asked leading ques-
tions and suggested to Mark Lilly that he had a motive to
exculpate himself from the serious crime of capital murder.277
Furthermore, Mark Lilly admitted to being under the influence
of drugs and alcohol during his questioning.78 All of these fac-
tors supported the Court's conclusion that Mark Lilly's state-
ments were not sufficiently reliable to eliminate the need for
confrontation and cross-examination.279
Finally, in Part VI the Court held that admitting Mark Lilly's
custodial confession accusing the defendant of capital murder
violated Petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights.2' The Court
271 See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1900-01.





' See id. During Mark Lilly's taped interrogation, the police told him that he
would face a life sentence unless he "broke 'family ties"' and told them what hap-
pened. Id. at 1892.
278 See id.
2" See id.
28 See id. at 1901.
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reversed the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision and re-
manded the case to the Virginia courts for a harmless-error de-
termination and for further proceedings not inconsistent with
its opinion.
B. JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Breyer wrote separately, arguing that the Court
should reexamine its view of the relationship between the Con-
frontation Clause and the hearsay rule. 2  Currently, a statement
against a defendant must fall within a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception or bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness to
be admitted under the Confrontation Clause .2 " This close con-
nection between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule
is of relatively recent vintage, whereas the Confrontation Clause
has "ancient origins that predate the hearsay rule. 2  Justice
Breyer reiterated that the right to confrontation was established
originally to prevent abuses by the government against a crimi-
nal defendant on trial .2e This right, he argued, has been un-
dermined by the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule the
Court has permitted under Confrontation Clause analysis. 86
Justice Breyer asserted that the "current hearsay-based Con-
frontation Clause test" is "both too narrow and too broad.,
28 7
The test is too narrow because it permits admission of out-of-
court statements that fall within a "firmly rooted hearsay excep-
2' See id.
282 See id. at 1902 (BreyerJ., concurring). Justice Breyer noted that the ACLU ami-
cus brief, citing opinions of this Court and scholars, suggested that the relationship
be reexamined. See id. See also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (Thomas, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment); AEHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTON
AND CRIMINAL PROcEDURE: FiRsT PRiNCn'i.Es 129 (1997); Berger, supra note 9, at 557;
Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEo. L.J. 1011
(1998).
Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1901-02 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
" Id. at 1902 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer suggested that the Bible,
Shakespeare, and sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English statutes all referenced
one's right to face his or her accuser. Id.
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). Exemplified by the abuses in Sir Walter Raleigh's
trial for treason, it has been suggested that the Framers feared convictions based on
out-of-court confessions by accusers who were unavailable at trial to defend their
statements in open court. See id.
Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
"7 Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
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don" regardless of their reliabilitysss Justice Breyer used the co-
conspiracy exception as an example and suggested that if the
conspiracy happened to continue through the time of police
questioning, the confession could be admitted without cross-
examination.289 Criminal defendants, Breyer contended, should
not be denied the right to "come face to face" with their accus-
ers simply because of fortuitous circumstances&°
At the same time, Justice Breyer contended that the current
test is too broad because it requires the Court to make a "consti-
tutional issue out of the admission of any relevant hearsay
statement, even if that hearsay statement is only tangentially re-
lated to the elements in dispute."21 That is, if a statement does
not fall within a firmly rooted exception, the Court must evalu-
ate its reliability under the Roberts test even if the statement was
made without any relation to the trial.Y In this case, he argued
that admission of evidence like a "scrawled note, 'Mary called,'
dated many months before the crime," does not seem to violate
the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights.25 It does not,
however, fit into a traditional hearsay exception or demonstrate
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 4 justice Breyer
suggested, therefore, that the test appears to protect "trustwor-
thiness" instead of "confrontation."
Justice Breyer concluded by suggesting that reexamination
of the Confrontation Clause test was not critical in this case be-
cause Mark Lilly's statements so clearly violated Petitioner's
Confrontation Clause rights regardless of the Confrontation
Clause analysis.2 Nonetheless, in Breyer's opinion, the Court's
failure to reexamine the relationship between the Clause and
2 Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
2 "Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
m Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
29 Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
2 See id. at 1903 (BreyerJ., concurring).
" Id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
.. See id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
s Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer reiterated Justice Scalia's dissent in
Mayland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), in which Scalia as-
serted that the Confrontation Clause guarantees particular trial procedures, not reli-
able evidence. Id.
Lilly, 119 S.Ct. at 1903 (BreyerJ., concurring).
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the hearsay rules in this case "leaves the question open for an-
other day."2"
C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Scaliajoined parts I, II, and VI of the Court's opin-
ion and concurred in the judgment.28 Justice Scalia wrote sepa-
rately because he concluded the admission of Mark Lilly's
statement was a "paradigmatic" violation of the Confrontation
Clause.2 Admission of a taped confession without the right to
cross-examination, Scalia argued, violated Petitioner's Sixth
Amendment rights. 00 Because one's constitutional right to con-
frontation extends to "extrajudicial statements insofar as they
are contained in formalized testimonial material, such as ...
confessions,"30' the "violation is clear. 0 12 Justice Scalia main-
tained that the Court, therefore, should remand the case solely
for a harmless-error determination.3
D. JUSTICE THOMAS'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Thomas concurred in parts I and VI of the Court's
opinion and concurred in the judgment.0 4 While Justice Tho-
mas reiterated his position in White v. Illinois0 5 and posited that
a defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights implicate
statements contained in confessions, he agreed with the Chief
Justice that the Confrontation Clause "does not impose a 'blan-
ket ban on government's use of accomplice statements that in-
criminate a defendant."'s He stated that such a ban would
27 See id. (BreyerJ., concurring).
" See id. at 1903 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. (ScaliaJ., concurring).
See id. (ScaliaJ., concurring).
'o, Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364-65
(1992) (ThomasJ., concurring)).
m Id. (Scalia,J., concurring).
-"'See id. (Scalia,J., concurring).
See id. (ThomasJ, concurring).
'5 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). Here, Justice Thomas asserted that the Confrontation Clause "extends to
any witness who actually testifies at trial" and "is implicated by extrajudicial statements
only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial material, such as affida-
vits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." Id.




contradict the historical basis of the Confrontation Clause and
make appellate review of admission of accomplice statements
impossible."0 7 Justice Thomas also agreed with the Chief Jus-
tice's assertion that the Court should not have analyzed the reli-
ability of the confession under the second prong of the Roberts °8
test since the courts below did not address that issue. 9
E. CHIEFJUSTICE REHNQUIST'S CONCURRENCE
The Chief Justice '0 concurred in the judgment reversing
the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia but disagreed
with both of the plurality's major holdings.3 r He disagreed with
the Court's declarations (1) that all accomplice confessions in-
culpating a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, and (2) that appellate courts should inde-
pendently review the government's proffered guarantees of
trustworthiness under the second prong of the Roberts test.
3'1
The Chief Justice argued first that Mark Lilly's statements
were not against his penal interest.1 3 The self-inculpatory por-
tion of Mark Lilly's confession suggesting he aided and abetted
the petitioner was very separate from the portion where he ac-
cused his brother of murdering DeFilippis.Y Mark Lilly's entire
statement, therefore, could not be characterized as against his
penal interest.31 5  Consequently, the Chief Justice contended
that this case did not raise the question whether a genuinely
self-inculpatory statement that also inculpates a co-defendant
'0Id. (Thomas,J., concurring).
m Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1903 (ThomasJ, concurring).
"" The ChiefJustice was joined byJustices O'Connor and Kennedy.
31Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1903 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
"'2 See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
"s See id at 1904. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
3,, See id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). The ChiefJustice indicated that Mark Lilly
identified Ben as the "triggerman" in the following colloquy:
M.L.: I don't know, you know, dude shoots him.
G.P.: When you say "dude shoots him" which one are you calling a dude here?
M.L.: Well, Ben shoots him.
G.P.: Talking about your brother, what did he shoot him with?
M.L.: Pistol.
G.P.: How many times did he shoot him?
M.L.: I heard a couple of shots go off. I don't know how many times he hit him.
Id. at 1904 n.1 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring)
'5 See id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
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violates the Confrontation Clause. The Chief Justice asserted
that given the facts of this case, "our precedent does not compel
the broad holding suggested by the plurality...., 17
The Chief Justice reasoned that the cases cited by the plu-
rality in support of its "broad holding" involved custodial con-
fessions by accomplices taken by police for prosecution."" He
argued that incriminating statements made during custodial
confessions have always been viewed with special suspicion by
the Court given the declarant's motivation to shift blame to a
co-defendant.319 The Chief Justice agreed with the Court that
admission of these statements violates the right to confronta-
tion, but there are some situations, he contended, where ac-
complice statements may fall under a firmly rooted hearsay
exception.
The Chief Justice suggested that certain statements, such as
confessions made to family members and friends or fellow pris-
oners, bear sufficient indicia of reliability that would make con-
frontation superfluous.3 1  Because the Court has always
distinguished these cases from custodial confessions, the Chief
Justice argued that the Court should continue to permit admis-
sion of such statements. 22 The Chief Justice noted, however,
that Mark Lilly's statements did not fall into this category be-
cause his confession was exculpatory in nature and might have
been motivated by blame-shiftings2 The Chief Justice asserted
that he would hold only that Mark Lilly's statement cannot sat-
isfy a firmly rooted hearsay exception and it should not be ad-
missible without the right to confrontation.3 24 According to the
316 See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
3
17 Id. (Rehnquist, Cj., concurring).
31 Id. at 1904-05 (Rehnquist, Cj., concurring).
19 Id. at 1905 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
""See id. (Rehnquist, Cj., concurring).
II, See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The ChiefJustice argued that the plurality
mischaracterized Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). He asserted that Dutton was not
an "exception" to the line of cases, but distinguishable because the confession was
made to a fellow inmate, not to the police in a custodial inquiry. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at
1905 (Rehnquist, Cj., concurring).
See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
See id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
32 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
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Chief Justice, therefore, this case did not warrant such a broad
ruling by the Court.32
Secondly, the Chief Justice argued that the Court should
have remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Virginia to
decide the harmless-error question and whether Mark Lilly's
confession bears "'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness'
under Roberts.026 The Virginia court addressed whether the
confession was admissible under state hearsay rules, but not
whether it violated the Confrontation Clause. The Chief Jus-
tice concluded that the court below did not address the issue
and thus the plurality should not have ruled on whether Mark's
statements were admissible under the second prong of Roberts. 8
Furthermore, the Chief Justice argued that in the absence
of a lower court ruling as to the reliability of the statements un-
der the Confrontation Clause, the Court cannot rationalize its
ruling that appellate courts must independently review a lower
court's determination of trustworthiness.3 The Chief Justice
asserted that the Court should have deferred to trial court
judges' determinations of reliability. °30 Although a determina-
tion of reliability is a mixed question of fact and law, the Chief
Justice argued that it "weighs heavily on the 'fact' side." '' He
maintained that an independent review of trustworthiness un-
dermines the accuracy of a trial court judge's factual determina-
tion.332 Appellate courts and the Supreme Court in particular,
therefore, should defer to the factual findings of the trial courts
that are better positioned to evaluate the reliability of hearsay
statements.3
V. ANALYSIS
In Lilly v. Virginia, the Court properly held that an accom-
plice's confession inculpating a criminal defendant does not fall
'2 See id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
"6 Id. at 1905 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
'2 See id. (Rehnquist, Cj., concurring).
32 See id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
-2 See id. at 1905-06 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
' See id. at 1906 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
"'Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
'"See id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
3 See id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
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within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.s The Court did not,
however, establish a per se rule barring admission of accom-
plices' confessions as proposed by the ACLU.8 5 Because the
Court decided to reaffirm the Roberts test in lieu of a bright line
test for admissibility, Justice Stevens authorized appellate courts
to independently review lower courts' determinations of trust-
worthiness under the residual admissibility test.3 16 Lilly will make
it more difficult for the government to prosecute co-defendants,
but the Court properly bolstered criminal defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights against the government's interest in expedi-
ent criminal prosecution.3 7 Nevertheless, Lilly did not signifi-
candy impact the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
except to affirmatively declare that accomplices' statements in-
culpating a criminal defendant must be carefully scrutinized for
sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.
A. DEFINING "FIRMLY ROOTED"
The ChiefJustice criticized the plurality for broadly holding
that accomplices' confessions inculpating a criminal defendant
do not fall within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay
rule.sss The ChiefJustice suggested that the holding was unnec-
essary in light of the facts of this case.3 9 This Note argues, how-
ever, thatJustice Stevens' discourse served to dispel some of the
confusion as to what makes certain hearsay exceptions "firmly
rooted."'
Justice Stevens used the Roberts residual admissibility test to
justify his holding that these "against penal interest" exceptions
' See id. at 1900.
"3See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae in support of
Petitioner at 2, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
33See id.
-" Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1903 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring); see also Brief of the States
of Nebraska et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Respondent at 1, Lilly (No. 98-5881)
[hereinafter States' Brief] (' The amici states are charged with the responsibility of
protecting the citizens of their respective states by the capture, conviction and re-
moval of criminals from the general civilian population.").
"3 Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1903 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
"'Id. at 1904 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). The ChiefJustice explained that Mark
Lilly's confession was exculpatory in nature and the statements incriminating his
brother were "not in the least against [his] penal interest." Id.
'40 See Goldman, supra note 9, at 3. Goldman argued that the "firmly rooted" dis-
tinction is "neither workable nor useful" and proposed that a better method for de-
termining admissibility is a case-by-case analysis of trustworthiness. Id.
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are not firmly rooted hearsay exceptions!" In so doing, Justice
Stevens suggested that a statement falls within a firmly rooted
exception if it has historically satisfied the residual admissibility
test. 2 Because Confrontation Clause requirements were satis-
fied when the statement was made under circumstances that
provided sufficient "indicia of reliability" and "the demands of
the Confrontation Clause 'can be inferred without more in a
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception,' 343 it is logical to conclude that a statement falls within
a firmly rooted hearsay exception only if it has historically been
made under circumstances that provided sufficient indicia of re-
liability. Statements that fall within a firmly rooted exception,
therefore, have provided sufficient indicia of reliability over
time to make a fact-specific determination unnecessary.3 "
Justice Stevens properly concluded that this category of
"against penal interest" exceptions does not fall within a firmly
rooted exception. Justice Stevens laboriously demonstrated that
this category of statements lacks both historic precedent and
presumptive reliability to warrant admission without adversarial
testing.' While the ChiefJustice argued that the plurality's dis-
cussion of the various "against penal interest" categories was
unnecessary, this Note contends that Justice Stevens's explana-
tion provided lower courts with the Court's reasoning behind
the first prong of the Roberts test and may serve to limit the use
34 Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1895-99.
312Id. at 1895.
,43 Goldman, supra note 9, at 6 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
14" See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1898. The Court has been criticized for not defining
clearly the indicia of reliability necessary to satisfy the Roberts test. Although it did not
explicitly propose what appropriate "indicia" would be, it discussed at length some of
the factors necessary for such an inquiry, such as history of the exception, length of
use, and judicial precedent. See Goldman, supra note 9, at 2-3. The ACLU argued,
however, that "trustworthiness" must be better defined. See Motion For Leave to File
and Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Vir-
ginia, In Support of Petitioner at 18, Lilly (No. 98-5881) [hereinafter ACLU's Brief].
As it stands, it provides insufficient guidance as to what is or is not admissible. See id.
3'- Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1894-98. Justice Stevens explained that the category is of
"quite recent vintage" and the Court has previously declared that accomplice state-




of "firmly rooted" as justification for admission of unreliable
statements in criminal prosecution.4
B. REEXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND APPLICABLE HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
Lilly provided the Court with another opportunity to reex-
amine its interpretation of the relationship between the Con-
frontation Clause and the hearsay rule. 47 The Confrontation
Clause and the hearsay rule are similar in that both exclude
from evidence certain out-of-court statements, but not every
statement "admissible under all judicially or statutorily created
hearsay exceptions will necessarily comply with the require-
ments of confrontation."3 8 Nevertheless, the Court has, in ef-
fect, merged the two in its Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence.3 9 As a result, the Court has been criticized both
for denigrating the right to confrontation and constitutionaliz-
ing evidentiary rules.s
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer argued that the plurality
should have reexamined the relationship between the Confron-
tation Clause and the hearsay rule. 5 1 This Note argues, how-
ever, that Justice Stevens adopted much of the ACLU's
argument for greater protection of Sixth Amendment rights
without jeopardizing the public interest in prosecuting crimi-
nals. 52 The ACLU argued that the Court should adopt a per se
rule for the exclusion of certain accomplice statements353 while
sixteen state Attorneys General argued that the hearsay rule
should be broadened to provide triers of fact with the maximum
amount of evidence possible. 54
'' See Goldman, supra note 9, at 13; see also United States v. Valenzuela, 53 F. Supp.
2d 992, 999 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (refusing to admit inculpating statement because the
government failed to establish the trustworthiness of the statement).
37 Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1902 (BreyerJ., concurring).
"' Goldman, supra note 9, at 4-5.
SeeACLU's Brief at 13, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
350 See id. at 2; see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 366 (1992) (Thomas, J., con-
curring); Berger, supra note 9, at 559.
' Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1903 (BreyerJ., concurring).
" See generally ACLU's Brief at 19, Lilly (No. 98-5881); States' Brief at 1, Lilly (No.
98-5881).
"3 ACLU's Brief at 19, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
... States' Brief at 2, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
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The ACLU made a historical, textual, and prudential argu-
ment for the adoption of a per se rule that states certain kinds
of confessions never satisfy the Confrontation Clause.55 The
ACLU first explained the historical premise of the Confronta-
tion Clause. The ACLU argued that the Framers did not in-
tend the right to confrontation to be qualified by the Court's
evaluation of the witness' statement. M7 The ACLU also asserted
that the Confrontation Clause should be analyzed within the
context of the Sixth Amendment as a whole.5s Confrontation is
not purely an evidentiary fact-finding tool, the ACLU con-
tended, but an integral piece of the general protections af-
forded criminal defendants. 5 9 Rights enunciated in the Sixth
Amendment, such as the rights to an impartial jury, to obtain
witnesses in one's favor, and to have defense counsel, suggest
that fact-finding was not the Framers' primary concern.- The
ACLU asserted that the Supreme Court had lost sight of the his-
torical and textual basis for the Confrontation Clause and had
focused too heavily on its fact-finding role.3 61 The ACLU pro-
posed that the Court reestablish the constitutional protections
of the Confrontation Clause as intended by the Framers and
significantly limit the permissible exceptions in an effort to "re-.1 • ,, 62
invigorate the clause.
The ACLU argued the Confrontation Clause needs reinvig-
orating from a prudential standpoint as well. 63 The ACLU ar-
gued that a per se exclusion of accomplice statements that
'5 ACLU's Brief at 19-28, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
"' See id. at 3-11. The ACLU reiterated the Sir Walter Raleigh story, see supra note
9. It then explained why the Framers included the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth
Amendment. Id. at 10; see also supra Part I.
W
7 ACLU's Brief at 4, Lilly (No. 98-5881).




' See id. The ACLU contended that the Court has not taken similar liberties with
other Sixth Amendment rights. Id. For example, one's right to a jury trial is not
waived simply because a judge might better understand complex legal issues. See id.
Analogously, a defendant's right to an attorney is never waived just because capable
counsel might interfere with the prosecution's case by making objections and chal-
lenging the admission of evidence. See id.
' 1 Id. at 11-12. The ACLU blamed the change on Wigmore who "subordinated the
confrontation right to hearsay." Id. at 12 (citing 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE ch. 47 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1974) ('The Hearsay Rule Satisfied by Confrontation")).
362 Id. at 1.
363Id. at 23-24.
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incriminate a defendant would provide greater consistency in
criminal prosecution.' The current test focuses on trustwor-
thiness and affords courts too much discretion in determining
admissibility since the Court has not instructed lower courts as
to what factors to consider when making a trustworthiness de-
termination'6s The ACLU also contended that a per se rule
would serve as a check on police power.s" The right to confron-
tation protects criminal defendants from admission of state-
ments that the government might have obtained through
coercion and thus permits the public to scrutinize the govern-
ment's process in obtaining confessions and accusatory state-
ments.s 7 Without confrontation, the government "has the huge
advantage of choosing whether to offer the contents of the
statement through the testimony of the often discreditable de-
clarant, or through the testimony of a presumptively upright
person involved in law enforcement. . .. "'6 This practice, the
ACLU argued, mirrors the abuses prevalent in sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century English criminal prosecution&3
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers70
suggested that this practice is especially endemic in states with
"6 Id. at 19 (asserting that the "trustworthiness view of confrontation" affords
courts "enormous, virtually unreviewable, discretion" in determining admissibility of
hearsay evidence). But ef. Brief Amicus Curiae for the CriminalJustice Legal Founda-
tion ("CJLF") in support of Respondent at 6, Lilly (No. 98-5881) (asserting thatjurors
are sufficiently savvy to recognize that accomplices' statements are not as reliable as
other out-of-court statements). This Note contends that the CJLF's argument con-
tradicts the Bruton rule which states thatjury limiting instructions are equivalent to no
instructions, since the jury is likely to consider the evidence regardless of the instruc-
tions. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968); supra Part II.
' SeeACLU's Brief at 19, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
3' Id. at 23.
367 See id.
s~sId.
so See id. at 22-23; see also Berger, supra note 9, at 609.
sT See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief of National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioner at 1,
Lilly (No. 98-5881) [hereinafter NACDL's Brief]. The Brief was filed by the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL"), an organization that seeks to
defend individual liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, the Virginia College of
Criminal Defense Attorneys, NACDL's Virginia state affiliate, and the Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse, a clinical program at Washington and Lee University committed
to making the right to effective assistance of counsel meaningful in Virginia capital
cases.
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sentencing laws like Virginia's "triggerman" statute."7 ' In cases
where the government lacks concrete evidence to prosecute one
defendant for murder, co-participants have a strong incentive to
confess early and blame a cohort for the actual murder. 72 Be-
cause the government faces significant societal pressure to con-
vict, especially in heinous crimes like the murder of DeFilippis
in Lilly, the prosecution has strong incentive to believe the de-
clarant s5 In such cases, however, the prosecution prefers to
protect the declarant from potentially damaging cross-
examination.3 74 At Petitioner's post-sentencing hearing, for ex-
ample, Mark Lilly recanted his statements to the police and
claimed that he lied during his custodial confession. 7 5 Had
Mark Lilly been cross-examined at Petitioner's trial, he might
have admitted to the jury that he lied to police, thus undermin-
ing the prosecution's entire case.
Despite the ACLU's strong argument for a per se rule bar-
ring admission of accomplices' confessions, the Court stated
over a century ago in Mattox that the Framers intended there to
be exceptions to the Confrontation Clause when warranted by
371 See id. at 13. Petitioner was convicted of capital murder under VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-31(4) (Michie Supp. 1999). The Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted the
code provision in Coppola v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 797, 806 (Va. 1979), and held
that "[e]xcept in the case of murder for hire, only the immediate perpetrator of a
homicide, the one who fired the fatal shot, and not an accessory before the fact or a
principal in the second degree, may be convicted of capital murder under the provi-
sions of § 18.2-31." A defendant convicted of capital murder in Virginia faces either
the death sentence or life in prison without the possibility of parole. VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-164.4 (Michie Supp. 1998) (cited in NACDL's Brief at 7 n.6, Lilly (No.98-5881)).
372 See NACDL's Brief at 12, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
"' See id. at 13.
37" See id. Another Virginia case analogous to Lilly illustrated the value of cross-
examination. See id. In 1997 two Virginia men, Ceparano and Cressell, were charged
with the murder of G.P.Johnson. See id. at 13-14 (citing Commonwealth v. Ceparano,
Nos. 97-186, 97-187 (Cir. Ct. Grayson County 1997); Commonwealth v. Cressell, No.
98-73 (Cir. Ct. Grayson County 1997)). Cressell was charged with capital murder and
Ceparano entered into a plea agreement with the government to testify that Cressell
murderedJohnson. See id. at 13. After an intense two-hour cross-examination of the
accuser, the jury returned a verdict downgrading the defendant's conviction to first
degree murder, sparing him from a death sentence. See id. at 14. Had the accom-
plice's confession been admitted without subjecting him to confrontation and cross-
examination, the jury might not have drawn the same conclusion. Thus, admission of
incriminating statements without the right to cross-examination interferes with the
truthfinding process. See id.
3' See Petitioner's Brief at 7, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
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public policy.3 6 Since then, the Court has repeatedly refused to
create a per se rule excluding hearsay statements, choosing in-
stead to rely on a trustworthiness determination.377 Accordingly,
Justice Stevens utilized the ACLU's argument to the fullest ex-
tent possible without jeopardizing the government's ability to
prosecute criminals and utilize permissible exceptions to the
hearsay rule. There are times when even accomplice state-
ments, which the Court has deemed to be presumptively unreli-
able, are made in circumstances that guarantee trustworthi-
378ness.
The sixteen states writing as Amici Curiae in support of Vir-
ginia argued that these particular circumstances actually war-
rant greater leniency in the hearsay rule.3s The states argued
that the "search for truth," arguably the goal of every trial and
the premise on which the Confrontation Clause was based, can
only be realized by providing the trier of fact with all the rele-
vant information available."' This Note suggests that Justice
Stevens recognized the government's need to introduce as
much reliable evidence as possible in a criminal prosecution and
therefore reaffirmed and explained the Roberts residual admissi-
bility test. Had Justice Stevens adopted the states' position and
broadened permissible hearsay exceptions, the Court would have
threatened the constitutional right to confrontation.
This Note recognizes that the Court's ruling will make it
more difficult to prosecute in cases with multiple defendants
because custodial confessions cannot be easily admitted into
evidence. Lilly, however, permits prosecutors to introduce ac-
complice statements so long as they can overcome the presump-
tion of unreliability under careful scrutiny by the court by
demonstrating sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.s1
While this Note agrees with the states that fact-finding and
truthseeking are critical to a fair trial, the plurality properly pro-
"' See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); see also supra Part II.
S"'SeeACLU's Brief at 19, Lilly (No. 98-5881); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
352 (1992) (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990); Roberts v. Ohio, 448
U.S. 56, 68 n.9 (1980)).
378 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (holding that the admission of an ac-
complice's confession to a fellow prison inmate did not violate the defendant's right
to confrontation).





tected criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights. Accord-
ingly, the Court rejected the per se rule against the admission of
accomplices' statements incriminating a defendant Unfortu-
nately, however, the Court provided little direction to courts as
to what is or is not trustworthy or what are "indicia of reliabil-
ity.' s" Although the Court is properly committed to "steer[ing]
a middle course,"8 a stronger ruling that more clearly deline-
ates the distinctions between the Confrontation Clause and ad-
missible hearsay statements would provide better direction to
courts resulting in more consistency while simultaneously pro-
tecting criminal defendants' constitutional guarantees.
C. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
In light of the plurality's decision not to establish a per se
rule regarding admission of accomplice statements under the
Confrontation Clause, Justice Stevens properly gave appellate
courts authority to review determinations of reliability de novo.8
Although determinations of reliability are mixed questions
of law and fact,386 the Virginia prosecutor argued, and Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist agreed, that the determination is very "fact-
intensive" and should be left to a jury to evaluate.'8 7 The Chief
Justice contended that the plurality's decision to give appellate
courts the authorization to review de novo undermines the
power and discretion of the trial courts.3m Commentators sug-
gested, however, that had the Court agreed with the Common-
wealth and deferred to the lower court's determination of
whether the statement was self-inculpatory, "Lilly [would have]
prove[d] a significant boon to prosecutors" because no one
Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1899 n.5.
The Court did not present a list of factors in Lilly or in its precedent cases for
lower courts to consider in determining admissibility of hearsay statements. Stanley
Goldman contended that the Court's failure to discuss factors that suggest reliability
"is a major flaw in the Supreme Court's attempt to set forth a definitive standard for
determining which hearsay statement can be admitted without violating the confron-
tation clause." Goldman, supra note 9, at 14.
" Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68 n.9 (1980).
"5 Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1903 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1906 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring).
See id. at 1906 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
'87 Williams, supra note 131, at 36.
3" Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1906 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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could review admission of questionable hearsay statementsss9
Without independent review by appellate courts, the commen-
tators said, "prosecutors everywhere w[ould have] really
push [ed] it,"3 and thus jeopardized the protections afforded
criminal defendants by the Confrontation Clause.91
Appellate review, therefore, serves as check on prosecutorial
power. Independent review protects criminal defendants
from trial courts' broad discretion to admit hearsay statements
pursuant to the second prong of the Roberts test.s9 As Justice
Stevens suggested, "'independent review is ... necessary ... to
maintain control of, and to clarify the legal principles' govern-
ing the factual circumstances necessary to satisfy the protections
of the Bill of Rights." 94
D. THE IMPLICATION OF LJLLYON FUTURE ACCOMPLICES AND CO-
DEFENDANTS
Lilly did not significantly change the Court's Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence. While the plurality explicitly stated that
accomplice statements inculpating criminal defendant did not
fall within a firmly rooted exception, 95 the Court had already es-
tablished that, albeit implicitly. 9 Furthermore, Lilly simply reit-
erated the Court's prior finding that accomplices' confessions
taken by the government for the use at trial are presumptively
unreliable. 7 The combination of the two provisions, however,
raised the burden for prosecutors to introduce such state-
ments.398 Nevertheless, the Court did not completely bar ac-
"' See Williams, supra note 131, at 36.
Id. (quoting Mark Dobson, a Nova University School of law professor); see also
ACLU's Brief at 16, Lilly (No. 98-5881) (arguing that "lower courts [have] enormous
leeway to admit hearsay against a criminal defendant, subject to correction on in the
rare instance in which this Court grants certiorari").
... SeeWilliams, supra note 131, at 36.
"' SeeACLU's Brief at 17, Lilly (No. 98-5881).
"9 See id. at 19.
Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1900 (1999) (quoting Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996)).
Id. at 1899.
' Id. at 1899 n.5 (where the Court notes that several of its previous decisions
"were all premised, explicitly or implicitly, on the principle that accomplice confes-
sions that inculpate a criminal defendant... fall outside a firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception...").
97 Id. at 1900.
39 See id.
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complice statements from admission as suggested by the Chief
Justice and Justice Thomas.9 So long as the circumstances sur-
rounding a statement bear particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness, the prosecution can rebut the presumption of
unreliability and introduce an accomplice's statement. Thus,
Lilly made it more difficult to admit accomplices' confessions,
but it did not make it impossible!'
Since the Supreme Court announced Lilly v. Virginia on
June 10, 1999, several federal courts have cited Lilly in Confron-
tation Clause cases. °2 In United States v. Valenzuela, for example,
the district court excluded a statement made by a co-defendant
in which the defendant was accused of being the "ringleader" of
a drug operation.4 3 Its decision, reached before Lilly, was con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's holding 4" In an addendum to
the Valenzuela opinion, Judge Castillo praised the Lilly decision
for its "scholarly review of the constitutional dangers inherent in
the government's use of an unavailable accomplice's out-of-
court statements., 405  The court expressed its hope that the
reader of Lilly will similarly scrutinize the admission of accom-
plice statements because "the government and the interests of
justice are always better served by live accomplice testimony that
can be tested by in-court cross examination and, thus, appropri-
ately evaluated by the trier of fact.,
406
Other courts, however, have not demonstrated the same
commitment to Justice Stevens' opinion.0 7 Several simply cited
the "Lilly rule" holding that accomplice statements inculpating a
defendant do not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
3 See id. But see id. at 1905 (Rehnquist, GJ., concurring); id. at 1903 (Thomas, J.,
concurring)400 See id.
401 Id. at 1899 n.5.
412 See, e.g., United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156 (2nd. Cir. 1999); United States v.
Petrillo, 60 F. Supp. 2d 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Valenzuela, 53 F. Supp.
2d. 992 (N.D. Ill. 1999); State v. Gonzalez, 989 P.2d 419 (N.M. 1999).
403 Valenzuela, 53 F. Supp. 2d. at 993.
... Id. at 999. Judge Castillo also noted that the Venezuela decision "is in full con-
formity with the Lilly holding that, under circumstances similar to those in this case,
an unavailable co-defendant's confession to police that incriminates the defendant is
inherently suspect and, therefore, inadmissible as a declaration against interest." Id.
405 id.
406 Id.
407 See Gallego, 191 F.3d 156; United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 1999 WL 707783 (10th
Cir. Aug. 18, 1999); Petrillo, 60 F. Supp. 2d 217; Gonzales, 989 P.2d 419.
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tion. °8 In fact, the Southern District of New York suggested in
United States v. Petrillo that Lilly did little more than place a
"gloss" on prior law.409 This Note contends that while the plural-
ity carefully balanced the competing interests of defendants'
rights and prosecutorial efficiency, its decision not to create a
bright line rule for admissibility of accomplice statements incul-
pating a defendant makes it likely that the Court has not heard
its last case regarding the interplay of against penal interest ex-
ceptions and the Confrontation Clause.
E. IMPAGr OF THE PLURALITY OPINION ON FUTURE LITIGATION
Finally, it should be noted that while the Court's plurality
decision left the door open for the government to push for a
more lenient rule for the admission of accomplices' statements,
the concurring opinions did not provide much reasoning on
which future litigants can rely.41' Justice Breyer argued that the
Court should have reexamined the relationship between the
Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule to alleviate some of
the confusion regarding admissibility of hearsay evidence under
the Clause.1 2 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, asserted that the
facts so clearly indicated a Confrontation Clause violation that
no further discussion was warranted by the Court. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, however, contended that
the plurality moved too far from the "middle ground" on which
the Court had rested.4  Although Justice Stevens did not estab-
lish a "blanket ban" on the admission of all accomplice state-
4 See e.g., Gallego, 191 F.3d at 167; Lopez-Garcia, 1999 WL 707783, at *3; Petrillo, 60
F. Supp. 2d at 218; Gonzales, 989 P.2d at 427 (all citing to Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct.
1887 (1999)).4
1 Petrillo, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 218.
41' Because the Court gave appellate courts authorization to independently review
determinations of trustworthiness, the defendant in Gonzales, 989 P.2d 417 might pe-
tition the Court for certiorari. In this case, the Supreme Court of New Mexico distin-
guished Lilly and held that the accomplice's statement made during casual
conversation with an acquaintance bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to
overcome the presumption of unreliability. Id. at 422. Contrary to the concerns
voiced by ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Thomas, the Gonzales holding illustrated
that on occasion a court will decide an accomplice statement inculpating a criminal
defendant is trustworthy and should be admitted.
4,,Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1187, 1901-06 (1999).
Id. at 1901-03 (BreyerJ., concurring).
" Id. at 1903 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
", Id. at 1904 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 1903 (ThomasJ, concurring).
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ments incriminating a defendant as the ChiefJustice and Justice
Thomas suggested, the plurality did make it more difficult for
prosecutors to introduce such statements into evidence.415 Jus-
tice Thomas and the Chief Justice apparently feared the plural-
ity moved too close to a "per se rule" and argued that the facts
of this case did not warrant the broad holding.
With the exception ofJustice Breyer, therefore, the concur-
ring justices based their opinions on the specific facts of this
case. As Justice Breyer anticipated, therefore, Lilly left "the
question [of the current connection between the Confrontation
Clause and the hearsay rule] open for another day."
VI. CONCLUSION
In Lilly v. Virginia, the Court properly held that accom-
plices' statements that inculpate a criminal defendant are not
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.41' Furthermore, the
Court stated that the circumstances surrounding accomplice
custodial confessions incriminating a defendant are presump-
tively unreliable. 418 Thus, the prosecution must prove that the
circumstances in which the statements were made bear suffi-
cient guarantees of trustworthiness to make cross-examination
unnecessary.1 9 The Court also authorized appellate courts to
independently review the government's "particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness" when deciding if admission of a declar-
ant's out-of-court statement violates the Confrontation Clause. 2 °
The plurality's explanation of the rationale behind the
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception served to clarify some of the
confusion about admissibility of hearsay exceptions. The Court
properly reaffirmed the Roberts test, which permits courts to
admit such statements if they can overcome the presumption of
unreliability and demonstrate sufficient trustworthiness so as to
make confrontation and cross-examination unnecessary, but
failed to articulate what factors courts should consider in de-
termining trustworthiness. Because Lilly did not establish a per
se rule excluding accomplice statements that inculpate a crimi-
4- Id. at 1900.
416 Id. at 1904 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
"1
7 Id. at 1899.
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nal defendant, the Court authorized appellate courts to review
the determinations of trustworthiness to ensure protection of
the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
While Lilly provided an excellent discussion of the constitu-
tional dangers inherent in admitting an accomplice's custodial
confession, it is unlikely that the Court has heard its last case on
the admission of hearsay evidence under a Confrontation
Clause analysis.
Sarah D. Heisler
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